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Abstract
We examine the effect of labor income and health uncertainty on the optimal choices
of policyholders with Guaranteed Minimum Death Benefits embedded in Variable An-
nuities. These choices are determined in the context of a utility-based life cycle model
including bequest motives and optimal term life purchases. We then determine risk-
neutral prices from the perspective of the issuing financial institutions. In contrast to
previous studies which do not include income and health uncertainty, we find that very
risk-averse policyholders in weak job markets would be willing to pay the risk-neutral
price in order to receive these benefits. This occurs because an unemployed individual
with a low account balance would be unwilling to pay for term insurance, but has
precommitted to pay the now small GMDB fees in exchange for the death benefits.
JEL Classification Numbers: D91.
MSC Subject Categories: IE12, IB10.
Key Words: GMDB, Variable Annuity, Expected Utility.
∗Department of Finance and Insurance, Lingnan University, 8 Castle Peak Road, Tuen Mun, Hong Kong.
Tel: +852 2616 8153; fax: +852 2462 1073; E-mail: jingao@ln.edu.hk.
†Department of Risk Management and Insurance, Georgia State University, 35 Broad Street (11th Floor),
Atlanta, GA 30309, USA. Tel: +1 404 413 7485; fax: +1 404 413 7499; E-mail: inseuu@langate.gsu.edu.
1
1 Introduction
Guaranteed Minimum Benefits (GMxBs) embedded in Variable Annuity (VA) Contracts
have been a subject of significant interest since they became popular in the 1990s. Valuation
of these contracts can be done in two distinct ways following two different rationales. GMxB
values are most commonly computed in a risk-neutral framework which assumes complete
markets (see, for example, Bauer et al 2008). This approach makes sense when mortality risk
is diversifiable and market risk can be easily hedged. This method of valuation is therefore
most applicable to the insurance company issuing the policy. More recent work had focused
on the valuation of these benefits from the perspective of the policyholder. This individual
is not able to diversify the mortality risk nor is he typically able to hedge the market risk
at low cost. In this case, it is more reasonable to value the contract using a life-cycle model
which maximizes the utility of the contract to the policyholder including bequest motives.
This is the approach taken in a number of recent papers, including Gao and Ulm (2012),
Bauer and Moenig (2015), Gao and Ulm (2015), and Steinorth and Mitchell (2015).
Gao and Ulm (2015) combines both approaches to find a mutually agreeable price for
the Guaranteed Minimum Death Benefit (GMDB). They find that GMDBs fail to provide
value to the policyholder if a term life policy is also available. In other words, there is no
price on which an insurer who prices in a risk-neutral fashion and a policyholder who prices
by maximizes utility over his lifetime will agree. This paper introduces uncertainty in labor
income and health status to the model. In contrast to the earlier study, we find that agreeable
prices exist for certain parameter combinations. In particular, very risk-averse individuals
who face high unemployment risk will find that purchasing a GMDB at the risk-neutral
price will increase their utility. This occurs because an unemployed individual with a low
VA contract value will be unwilling to pay for term insurance, but has precommitted to pay
the now small GMDB fees in exchange for the death benefit.
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2 The Model
In the model, we apply a constant relative risk aversion (CRRA) type utility which has
a functional form
u(c) =

c1−γ
1− γ , γ > 0, γ 6= 1,
ln(c), γ = 1.
The insured1 and his beneficiary are risk averse with the CRRA utility type and gain utility
from consumption c. γ is the coefficient of relative risk aversion.
2.1 Objective Function
In our study, we assume a GMDB with return of premium and roll-up benefits. Further-
more, we incorporate unemployment risk and health uncertainty. This extends the analysis
in Gao and Ulm (2015). In the current setting, periodic income is stochastic and the mortal-
ity probability also varies according to policyholder’s health status. An individual purchases
a variable annuity contract with GMDB options and makes a lump sum deposit to the vari-
able annuity account. If the individual is employed during period t, he will receive labor
income and make consumption decisions. At the same time, he will also decide whether he
needs a term life policy to hedge against the risk of premature death. If his labor income
is not sufficient (e.g. because of poor health status or health uncertainty) to support his
consumption and term life policy purchase or he is unemployed, he will make a decision to
withdraw from his variable annuity account. In these cases, the GMDB level will be reduced
proportionally with the withdrawal ratio. For simplicity, we assume there is no other in-
vestment vehicle except the VA account and there is no interim deposit to the VA account.
After the consumption, withdrawal and term policy purchase decisions, still at period t, the
policyholder will decide the allocation between fixed and variable subaccounts in the VA ac-
count. If the policyholder dies at time t, the amount in the VA account, which is guaranteed
1We use “insured” and “policyholder” interchangeably throughout the paper.
3
by the GMDB, will be a bequest inherited by his beneficiary. In addition to the inheritance
from the policyholder’s VA account, the beneficiary also gets the term life policy payment
F c. Because of the existence of a bequest motive, the individual makes all his decisions to
maximize the joint utility of both his beneficiary and himself. After the individual dies,
the beneficiary inherits the money and maximizes her own utility by optimal allocation and
withdrawal. If the insured survives until his retirement age, at the end of the policy period,
he will get the entire account value and annuitize it for his retirement life.
According to the description above, the objective function can be expressed as follows,
(1) max
ωt,dt,Pt
E
[ T∑
t=1
βt(
∏t
i=1
φi)u(ct) + β
T (
∏T
i=1
φi)VT+1(aT+1) + . . .
. . . +
T∑
t=1
βt(
∏t−1
i=1
φi)(1 − φt)ζvB(bt + F ct )
]
,
In the objective function, the insured retires at the end of period T . ω is the percentage
of risky assets (wealth held in the variable subaccount) and 1−ω is the proportion of wealth
held in the fixed rate subaccount. Consistent with real world policies, our model assumes
ω ∈ [0, 1], i.e. short sales are not allowed. β is the subjective discount factor. φ is the
survival rate. ζ denotes the strength of the bequest motive2 and ranges from 0 to 1. If
ζ = 0, the insured has no bequest motive and does not leave anything to his beneficiary; if
ζ = 1, the insured is assumed to have the strongest bequest motive and treat his beneficiary
like himself. V is the policyholder’s value function and v is the beneficiary’s value function.
If the insured dies before retirement, the beneficiary will get b, which equals the greater
of the account value or the guaranteed amount, plus F c. P is the premium for the term
insurance policy. y is the periodic income at time t, and d is the withdrawal amount from
the VA account. The periodic consumption c is the sum of d and y.
When the policyholder purchases the variable annuity contract, the beneficiary has TB
years until retirement age. If the policyholder dies at time t, the beneficiary will receive the
2An overview of bequest motives is provided by Arrondel et al. (1997) and Masson and Pestieau (1997),
De Nardi (2004) and Ameriks et al. (2011).
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bequest plus term life benefit and have TB−t years until her retirement. As a rational person,
the beneficiary is not assumed to withdraw the total amount (bB) in a lump sum immediately.
She will consume by making withdrawal decision optimally and will allocate the remaining
amount between risky and risk-free accounts. Like the policyholder, the beneficiary will
make a retirement plan by transforming the money to a lifetime payout annuity after her
retirement. However, the beneficiary’s investment is not assumed to be protected by the
GMDB and she has no bequest motive. Therefore, the beneficiary’s objective function is
defined as follows,
(2) max
ωBt ,c
B
t
E
[ TB∑
tB=t
βtB−t(
∏tB−1
i=t
φi)u(c
B
t ) + β
TB−t(
∏TB
i=t
φi)vB(b
B
TB+1
)
]
.
With these objective functions, we can derive the Bellman equation of the insured as
follows,
Vt(at, bt) = max
ωt,dt,Pt
{
ut(ct) + (1− φt)ζvB(bt + F ct ) + βφtE[Vt+1(at+1, bt+1) | at, rt]
}
(3)
subject to
a1 = b1,
ct ≡ yt + dt, 0 ≤ dt ≤ at,
at+1 = (ωt(1 + rt+1) + (1− ωt)(1 + gt))(at − dt), 0 ≤ ωt ≤ 1,
kt+1 = kt(1 + rf )
at+1 − dt+1
at+1
,
bt+1 = max(kt+1, at+1),
F ct =
Pt
(1− φt)(1 + η) , 0 ≤ Pt < dt + yt,
VT+1(aT+1) =
Tmax∑
t=T+1
βt−(T+1)(
∏t−1
i=T+1
φi)u(c¯).
Most notation is defined above. η is the loading factor, which is the amount added to
the pure premium to cover other expenses, profit, and a margin for contingencies. The fixed
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subaccount grows at a fixed growth rate g and expected rate of return of the risky asset
is r. The return of premium and roll-up benefit level k is reduced proportionally with the
withdrawal amount d. Tmax is the longest time an individual can survive. c¯ is the periodic
consumption after retirement, and we assume it is the level payment (a life time payout
annuity) from the variable annuity account3. Given risk free rate rf , c¯ can be derived from
the terminal account value as follows,
aT+1 = (ωT (1 + rT+1) + (1− ωT )(1 + rf ))(aT − dT )
= c¯
Tmax∑
t=T+1
∏t−1
i=T+1
φi(1 + rf )
T+1−t,
=⇒ c¯ = aT+1∑Tmax
t=T+1
∏t−1
i=T+1 φi(1 + rf )
T+1−t .
The beneficiary’s constant consumption level after her retirement can be derived in the
same way.
2.2 2-Stage Bellman Equations
Following Hardy (2003), Bauer et al. (2008) and Gao and Ulm (2012, 2015), all state
variables are denoted as (·)t− , (·)t+ , i.e. the value immediately before and after the trans-
actions at a discrete time t, respectively. The policyholder receives labor income yt at t
−.
Still at time t−, withdrawal, consumption and term life policy purchase decisions are made.
Then the insured determines the investment allocation decision between the fixed and the
variable subaccounts at t+, which is still at time t but after he obtains income, makes de-
cisions regarding withdrawal, consumption and term life policy purchase. We also assume
that the beneficiary receives the inheritance (value in the VA account and face amount of
term life policy) immediately at t+ just after the insured dies at t+. We rewrite the Bellman
equation in the Model section to a two-stage Bellman equations. From t− to t+ (i.e. the first
3Chen, et al. (2006) introduce life time payout annuity which converts an accumulated investment amount
to a periodic payouts over the life of investors. As in Gao and Ulm (2012, 2015), we assume there is no
bequest motive after the individual retires and converts his VA account value to a lifetime payout annuity.
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stage), the insured consumes and gets the utility. If the insured dies, at t+ his beneficiary
will receive VA amount guaranteed by GMDB bt+ and face amount of term life policy F
c
t .
Therefore, the first stage equation is as follows,
(4) Vt−(at− , bt−) = max
dt,Pt
{
u(ct) + ζ(1− φt)vB(bt+ + F ct ) + Vt+(at+ , bt+)
}
.
Since the GMDB level will be reduced proportionally by the insured’s withdrawal at t−
from the variable annuity account, we rewrite the above equation as follows,
(5) Vt−(at− , bt−) = max
dt,Pt
{
u(yt + dt − Pt) + . . .
. . . + ζ(1− φ)vB(bt− at− − dt
at−
+ F ct ) + Vt+(at− − dt, bt−
at− − dt
at−
)
}
.
In the new equation above, we use all asset level variables subscripted by t−. With the
CRRA assumption, we can numerically generate a constant factor ψt at period t to make
vB(bt−
at− − dt
at−
) = ψt(bt−
at− − dt
at−
)1−γ, given ψt < 0 if γ > 1, and ψt > 0 if γ < 1. And
Equation (5) can be rewritten as
(6) Vt−(at− , bt−) = max
dt,Pt
{
u(yt + dt − Pt) + . . .
. . . + ζ(1− φ)ψt(bt− at− − dt
at−
+ F ct )
1−γ + Vt+(at− − dt, bt− at− − dt
at−
)
}
.
Then, at the 2nd stage, i.e. from t+ to (t+1)−, the insured maximizes the value function
Vt+(at+ , bt+) from optimally allocating between the two subaccounts and Vt+(at+ , bt+) is the
expected discounted value of EVt+1−(at+1− , bt+1−).
(7) Vt+(at+ , bt+) = max
ωt
{
βφtEVt+1−(at+1− , bt+1−)
}
.
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Finally, the terminal value at time (T + 1)− is as follows
(8) VT+1−(aT+1−) =
Tmax∑
t=T+1
βt−(T+1)(
∏t−1
i=T+1
φi)u(c¯).
3 Numerical Methodology
Since our model has no closed form solution, we will apply numerical analysis. We assume
the policyholder makes decisions monthly, i.e. the policyholder deposits a lump sum amount
into his VA account at the beginning of age 35, and he makes all decisions at the beginning
of every month until his retirement age (at the beginning of age 65). Following Gao and Ulm
(2015), we use the two-stage Bellman equations and apply a 2-Dimensional lattice. We solve
the utility optimization problem by backward induction from age t = T (at the beginning
of age 65, T = 360) to t = 1 (at the beginning of age 35). We discretize periodic fund value
A = [0, amax], into 51 nodes
4, and return of premium and roll-up benefit level B = [0, bmax],
into 51 nodes as well5. Therefore, at any given period t, we set a state space with 51 asset
levels by 51 GMDB levels, and the entire state space is 51 asset levels by 51 GMDB levels by
360 months from age 35 to 65. All state variables are denoted as (·)t− , (·)t+ . The backward
methodology can be described as follows:
From (t + 1)− to t+, we decide the insured’s allocation between the fixed and variable
subaccounts. Following Gao and Ulm (2012), we use a trinomial lattice with probabilities
pu, pd, and pm as follows,
pu =
Aω2 +Bω + C
(u− 1)(u− d) ,(9)
pd =
ω(erh − egh) + egh − 1
d− 1 −
Aω2 +Bω + C
(d− 1)(u− d) ,(10)
4Between 2 neighboring nodes, we define jump size following a trinomial tree setting, i.e. let a1 = (1/u)
25,
where u = eσ
√
3∆t is the jump size, and ai = a1 × ui−1, for i = 2, 3, · · ·, 51. If annual volatility σ = 15%,
then the monthly jump size u ≈ 1.07788. The lowest asset level is a1 = 0.1534, the middle node is a26 = 1,
and the largest node is a51 = 6.52
5we assume the value of every node in Aˆ is equal to the value of every node in Bˆ, i.e. ai = bi for
i = 1, 2, · · ·, 51.
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pm = 1− Aω
2 +Bω + C
(u− 1)(u− d) −
ω(erh − egh) + egh − 1
d− 1 +
Aω2 +Bω + C
(d− 1)(u− d) ,(11)
where
d =
1
u
,
A = e(2r+σ
2)h − 2e(r+g)h + e2gh,
B = (erh − egh)(2egh − d− 1),
C = (egh − 1)(egh − d).
Given GMDB level bi, let
(12) at+1− = at+ ×
(
d 1 u
)
.
Then at any given GMDB level bi, we derive
(13) Vt+(aj, bi) = max
ωt
{
βφ(puVt+1−(aj+1, bi) + pmVt+1−(aj, bi) + pdVt+1−(aj−1, bi))
}
,
for i = 1, 2, · · ·, 51 and j = 1, 2, · · ·, 51, where Vt+(·, ·) is a 51 × 51 matrix at time t+. By
taking the first derivative on ω, and the optimal ω is:
(14) ω? = −(d− 1)BVt+1,j − Vt+1,j−1 + (u− 1)(Vt+1,j − Vt+1,j+1)[(u− d)(e
rh − egh)−B]
2A[(d− 1)(Vt+1,j−1 − Vt+1,j) + (u− 1)(Vt+1,j − Vt+1,j+1)] .
From t+ to t−, we then maximize Vt− to determine the insured’s optimal withdrawal dt and
term life premium Pt according to Eq. (6) by using cubic spline interpolation. We repeat
the processes from (t+ 1)− to t+ and t+ to t− respectively until age 35.
4 Numerical Results
In this section, we present the sensitivity test results by incorporating unemployment
9
risk or health uncertainty. We assume the following parameter values as in Table 1.
Table 1: Common Parameters in the Base case
Strength of Bequest Motive ζ 0.5
Subjective Discount Rate β 0.97
Risk Free Rate rf 3%
Growth Rate of Fixed Subaccount g 4%
Expected Return of Risky Asset r 7%
Volatility of Risky Return σ 15%
GMDB roll-up rate rp 0
Annual Mortality Rate µ 1994 MGDB table 6
Monthly Income y 0.01
4.1 Unemployment Risk
Now the assumption of unemployment risk is added to our model. Therefore, there are
two states of labor income: State 1. y = 0.01 per period (month), the policyholder is
employed and receives a positive compensation y˜ > 0; State 2. y = 0, the policyholder
is unemployed and receives no income. These two states can be transited by following a
Markov transition probability matrix as follows,
Π(yt+1|yt) =
 0.95 0.05
0.3 0.7

If the policyholder is employed at time t, he has a 95% chance to remain employed and a
5% chance to become unemployed at time t+ 1; if the policyholder is unemployed at time t,
his probability of finding a job at t+ 1 is 30% and his probability of remaining unemployed
at t+ 1 is 70%. The steady state probability of employment is pi1 =
6
7
and the steady state
probability of unemployment is pi2 =
1
7
. The above Markov transition probability matrix
defines the base economy case. Since unemployment risks can vary, we test the policyholder’s
behavior under different economic situations. We define a good economy as one in which the
6Since the table provides annual mortality and we need to use monthly mortality rate, we assume uniform
distribution of deaths over the year, i.e. any given month 1/12 of the people die.
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employed insured is not likely to get unemployed, and a bad economy as one in which there
are few job openings, i.e. an unemployed insured has difficulty finding a job. The Markov
transition probability matrix of the good market case is as follows,
Π(yt+1|yt) =
 0.995 0.005
0.3 0.7

In the good market case, if the policyholder is employed at time t, he has a 99.5% chance
of remaining employed and a 0.5% chance of becoming unemployed at time t + 1; if the
policyholder is unemployed at time t, his probability of finding a job at t + 1 is 30% and
his probability of remaining unemployed at t + 1 is 70%. The steady state probability of
employment is pi1 ≈ 98.36% and the steady state probability of unemployment is pi2 ≈ 1.64%.
The Markov transition probability matrix of the weak market case is as follows,
Π(yt+1|yt) =
 0.95 0.05
0.1 0.9

Under the weak economy scenario, if the policyholder is unemployed at time t, he has a
90% chance of staying unemployed and a 10% chance of finding a job position at time t+ 1.
The steady state probability of employment is pi1 ≈ 66.67% and the steady state probability
of unemployment is pi2 ≈ 33.33%.
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4.1.1 Allocation and Withdrawal Choices
Figure 1: Age 45 allocation with γ = 2
Figure 2: Age 45 allocation with γ = 3
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Figure 3: Age 45 allocation with γ = 4
Figures 1-3 (age 45 allocation with different economy scenarios) detail the optimal alloca-
tion choices for the insured given unemployment risk during a particular year (age 45). Since
the insured is rational, he will take the unemployment risk into account when he allocates his
wealth to maximize his utility. Acknowledgment of the unemployment risk by the insured
ensures that he has a lower expectation for his human capital than if he were in a fixed
income situation. One can observe that the economic environment significantly influences
the policyholder’s allocation choices. If the economy is good, the policyholder expects more
human capital and is willing to take more financial risk and allocate more money to the risky
subaccount. If the economy is weak, the policyholder who worries about unemployment will
be more averse to financial risk and allocate less money to the risky subaccount compared
to both the good and base scenarios.
A further observation is that there is not a large difference between allocations made by
employed or unemployed policyholders in the good and base scenarios while the difference
becomes greater in the weak economy case. Given the Markov transition probabilities above,
the unemployed policyholder is expected to wait only 3 months (1/0.3) for a new job for
both the good and base cases. Since three months is a short period, therefore, a rational
policyholder will not reduce the risky allocation by much. However, the unemployed policy-
holder is expected to wait as long as 10 months (1/0.1) for a new job in the weak case. It
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therefore makes sense for him to reduce the risky allocation to keep liquidity/safe money for
current consumption.
The hump shape around the “at-the-money” area is caused by two effects: The first is
the GMDB effect. The insured allocates his asset according to the Merton (1969) allocation.
However, due to the existence of the GMDB option, the beneficiary may prefer a more agres-
sive allocation strategy around the “stock-at-strike” level in our study, because the downside
risk of his benefit is protected by the GMDB. When the GMDB is far out-of-the-money,
the GMDB protection is not valuable and the allocation is close to the Merton allocation.
When the GMDB is far in-the-money, the beneficiary is indifferent to the allocation prefer-
ence because she will receive the value at the strike level. Thus, the insured also prefers the
Merton allocation. In conclusion, the beneficiary has a strong preference to have an agressive
allocation near the at-the-money area. We call this an “argument” between the insured and
his beneficiary.
The second is the human capital effect. Individuals’ asset allocation varies with their
life-cycle and their income according to traditional financial planning advice. We assume
employment income (human capital), which is a safer capital than financial assets, thus the
insured would like to invest more in risky financial assets. The hump shape around the
at-the-money area can be partially explained by the human capital effect. When the asset
level is very large, the percentage of asset value represented by human capital is reduced and
the allocation percentage to the risky subaccount is reduced correspondingly. However, the
figures 1-3 are counter-intuitive when the asset level is low (as the asset value goes below
the GMDB strike level). The risky asset allocation should be high as the percentage of
riskless assets (human capital) is great, but our figures show a small allocation percentage.
This result occurs because our model assumes the policyholder consumes all periodic income
during the current period. The “rational” policyholder realizes he is not able to save this
part of wealth for his retirement or transfer it to his beneficiary but over-consume it. He will
become conservative in asset allocation. As the asset level is too low, the insured will prefer
to take risk and increase his allocation in the risky subaccount because he has little to lose
14
but much to gain.
In addition to economic conditions, the policyholder’s risk aversion levels also matter
for his allocation decision. As the risk aversion increases, the insured will invest less in the
variable subaccount. Given the value of the coefficient of relative risk aversion (γ = 2), the
risky allocation in Figure 1 is the greatest for all 3 economic scenarios compared to Figure
2 (γ = 3) and 3 (γ = 4).
Figures 4-6 show the effect of changing economic scenarios on the policyholder’s with-
drawal decisions from the VA account. When the policyholder is unemployed, we assume all
of his living expenses will be from the withdrawal of the VA account value. Therefore, we
observe that the proportion of withdrawals in unemployed states are much greater than in
employed states. In addition, the more money the unemployed policyholder has, the smaller
percentage he withdraws. When the asset level is low, the insured has to withdraw a large
proportion to cover his living expenses. As the asset level increases, the absolute value of
consumption is still increasing, but the consumption ratio is decreasing. When the policy-
holder is employed, he is reluctant to withdraw from the VA account when the GMDB is
in-the-money, because if he withdraws, the GMDB strike level will be reduced proportion-
ally and this will hurt his beneficiary. As the asset level increases near or above the GMDB
strike level, he starts to withdraw. In addition, we find the policyholder prefers to consume
more in both employed and unemployed states in good economic conditions, because when
the economy is good, the insured expects he will have more human capital and therefore
consume more to improve his living standards.
15
Figure 4: Age 45 allocation with γ = 4
Figure 5: Age 45 allocation with γ = 4
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Figure 6: Age 45 allocation with γ = 4
Figures 7-9 plot the at-the-money allocation in different economic scenarios through the
entire accumulation period (from age 35 to age 65). One can observe a downward trend in
risky assets allocation in all economic scenarios. As the policyholder ages, he will realize
his probability to die before retirement will reduce gradually and he will be more likely to
consume the VA assets. As a result, he will decrease the allocation to risky assets, and the
allocation will converge to the Merton allocation at age 65. In addition, one can observe some
obvious results. First, good market conditions encourage the policyholder to take more risk.
Second, less risk averse policyholders allocate more money to the risky subaccount. Finally,
the policyholder is willing to take more risk in employed states than in unemployed states.
Figures 10-12 show at-the-money withdrawal proportion from age 35 to age 65. Since all
consumption comes from withdrawing from the VA account in the unemployed states, one
can observe a higher withdrawal ratio than in the employed states. In addition, as explained
in Figures 4-6, the policyholder withdraws most in the good market scenario and least in
the weak market scenario.
17
Figure 7: At-the-money allocation with γ = 2
Figure 8: At-the-money allocation with γ = 3
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Figure 9: At-the-money allocation with γ = 4
Figure 10: At-the-money withdrawal with γ = 2
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Figure 11: At-the-money withdrawal with γ = 3
Figure 12: At-the-money withdrawal with γ = 4
4.1.2 Term Life Insurance Demand
In this section, We examine the policyholder’s term life demand. We assume all poli-
cyholder’s adjustments are made monthly. Figures 13 and 14 plot term life demand in the
base market conditions. There are several observations: First, the value of the loading factor
η influences the amount of the term life purchases. As term life policies become expensive
(η increases from 0 to 0.2), term life demand decreases. In addition, one can observe that
the demand decrease is smaller at low (less than 1) asset levels than high (greater than 1)
20
asset levels. The demand decreases dramatically as asset levels becomes very high because
wealthy people have alternative choices for leaving bequests. Thus, as term life becomes
expensive, wealthy people will choose other wealth transfer channels. However, poor people
have less investment vehicle choices. Although η increases, term life policies may still be
cheap and efficient wealth transfer vehicles for poor people. Second, the more risk averse the
policyholder is, the more term life he would like to purchase. When the risk aversion level
at γ = 4, the term life policy demand is the greatest; while when γ = 2, the term life policy
demand is the lowest. Third, employment states matter in the term life purchase decision,
especially when the asset level is low. People purchase term life policies to protect against
the loss of human capital. Thus, if the policyholder is unemployed, he will have a lower
demand for term life policies. Especially, when the asset level is very low, the policyholder
may regard other necessity consumption as the first priority and reduce his term life pur-
chases accordingly. Finally, unemployment risk influences the amount of term life demand.
Figures 15 and 16 plot term life demand when the economic condition is good, and Figures
17 and 18 plot term life demand when the economic condition is weak. In the good economic
scenario (Figures 15 and 16), one observes the strongest term life demand; while in the weak
economic scenario (Figures 17 and 18), one observes the weakest term life demand.
Figure 13: Base case term life demand with η = 0
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Figure 14: Base case term life demand with η = 0.2
Figure 15: Good market term life demand with η = 0
22
Figure 16: Good market term life demand with η = 0.2
Figure 17: Weak market term life demand with η = 0
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Figure 18: Weak market term life demand with η = 0.2
4.2 Health Uncertainty and Term life Insurance Demand
We now add health uncertainty to the model. In this case, the policyholder may get sick,
which has two effects. First, his working ability will be effected and he will earn less while
sick. Second, his mortality risk will increase and term life life purchases will become more
expensive. We set two health states (H) for the policyholder: healthy and unhealthy. These
two states can be transited by following a Markov transition probability matrix as follows,
Π(Ht+1|Ht) =
 0.95 0.05
0.3 0.7

If the policyholder is healthy at this period, he has a 95% chance of remaining healthy
and a 5% chance of being unhealthy in the following period; if the policyholder is unhealthy
in this period, his probability of recovering from sickness at next period is 30% and his
probability of remaining in the unhealthy state in the next period is 70%. In these two
health states, the mortality risks vary. If the policyholder is sick, the mortality risk will
be greater than in the healthy state. We focus on term life insurance demand given the
existence of health uncertainty in this section7.
7To avoid replication, it may be more worthy to focus on the discussion of term life insurance demand.
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In Figures 19 and 20 8, we plot the term life policy demand with health uncertainty. If the
policyholder is unhealthy in the current period, his mortality risk in the current period will
be doubled/tripled and his periodic income will be discounted by 50%. Since the increased
mortality risk results in lower working ability and greater term life premium in the unhealthy
state, it reduces the insured’s demand for term life policies. Especially when the unhealthy
insured has less savings, one can observe a large drop in the term life demand. However,
when the account value is very low, the unhealthy insured will increase the amount of term
life purchases because he has a bequest motive and a term life policy may be the best way
to leave a bequest in such a situation. When the insured is rich, he is not as sensitive to the
cost of term life as when he is poor. In addition, consistent with the previous analysis, the
term life demand will decrease as the account value increases.
Figure 19: Term life demand with doubled mortality at the sick state
8We use η = 0 in the analysis of Figures 19 and 20.
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Figure 20: Term life demand with tripled mortality at the sick state
4.3 GMDB Prices
Following Gao and Ulm (2012), we derive the GMDB “fair” prices by assuming the
insurer applies the strategy of assuming the insured makes optimal choices. In addition, we
follow Gao and Ulm (2015) to derive GMDB prices which the insured is willing to pay.
Table 2 compares the at-the-money GMDB fair price (basis points) to the GMDB price
which insured is willing to pay at age 35. In the case of unemployment risk, one can observe
the following results. First, as the risk aversion level increases, the GMDB fair price generally
decreases. This occurs because as the risk aversion level increases, the risky allocation
decreases and therefore the account value volatility decreases and the GMDB option price
decreases. However, if the policyholder is more risk averse, he may have more demand for
the GMDB option and therefore be willing to pay a higher price for GMDB protection.
Second, the economy matters in GMDB pricing and the policyholder’s decision to purchase.
If the economy is good, the policyholder will allocate more to the risky subaccount and
the insurer will charge a correspondingly higher price for the GMDB option. On the other
hand, the policyholder is willing to pay less for GMDB protection as the economy improves,
because they care less about equity risk during the prosperous period. Third, the term life
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loading factor influences the policyholder’s willingness to pay for the GMDB option. Both
the GMDB option and a term life insurance policy can be regarded as a pair of substitute
goods, because both products can help a policyholder hedge the risk of the loss of human
capital. Therefore, if the term life policy becomes expensive due to higher loading, people
will be willing to pay more to obtain the GMDB option instead. However, we can also
find the fair price charged by insurer does not change much, because the insurer’s charge
depends heavily on policyholder’s allocation and lapse decisions which do not change much.
Forth, unemployed policyholder is willing to pay a higher price for the GMDB option in any
underlying economic situation. Because he has far less human capital and has to rely on
the savings in the VA account. He has more incentive to hedge the downside risk with the
GMDB. Finally, because of the combined effects of these factors, one can observe that the
insured’s willingness to pay exceeds the insurer’s offer price in some scenarios (shown in bold
in Table 2).
In the case of health uncertainty, we find the following: First, as in the unemployment
risk case, the GMDB premium charged by insurer is negatively correlated with risk aversion
level while the policyholder’s willingness to pay is positively correlated with risk aversion
level. Second, if the mortality risk increases and makes the term life policy expensive, the
GMDB will be more valuable to the insured and he is willing to pay more for it. Third,
there is only a very slight difference in the willingness to pay between healthy and unhealthy
insureds. Finally, the risk aversion level plays an important role in filling the gap between the
price the insurer would like to charge and the price assessed from the insured’s perspective.
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Table 2: GMDB fair price vs. insured’s willingness to pay at age 35
γ Market Condition η fair price willingness to pay
Unemployment Risk employed/unemployed
4 good market 0 3.3520 1.2211/1.4241
4 good market 0.2 3.3633 1.4311/1.5872
4 base case 0 1.2733 1.4545/1.6044
4 base case 0.2 1.2779 1.7741/1.8977
4 weak market 0 0.1834 2.4308/2.8751
4 weak market 0.2 0.1856 2.5528/3.5476
3 good market 0 4.9274 1.0887/1.1505
3 good market 0.2 4.9335 1.2075/1.3876
3 base case 0 2.3978 1.3733/1.4727
3 base case 0.2 2.4070 1.6636/1.8119
3 weak market 0 0.5373 2.3602/2.7206
3 weak market 0.2 0.5416 2.5125/3.1932
2 good market 0 6.5081 0.8667/1.0023
2 good market 0.2 6.5130 1.0000/1.1333
2 base case 0 4.8513 1.3333/1.4444
2 base case 0.2 4.8587 1.5630/1.7283
2 weak market 0 2.2786 2.2273/2.5447
2 weak market 0.2 2.2862 2.4545/2.8318
γ Mortality Income fair price willingness to pay
Health Uncertainty (healthy/unhealthy)
4 double half 2.7182 2.2537/2.2310
4 triple half 2.7290 2.3337/2.3180
3 double half 4.2390 1.5245/1.4840
3 triple half 4.2594 1.6135/1.5840
2 double half 5.9678 1.0267/0.9911
2 triple half 6.0216 1.0459/1.0271
5 Conclusions
In the paper we examine the effect of labor income and health uncertainty on the optimal
choices of policyholders with Guaranteed Minimum Death Benefits. We find that being
unemployed has a significant effect on a policyholders demand for term life insurance. In
particular, unemployed individuals with low account values are unwilling to sacrifice current
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consumption for beneficiary protection. This, in turn, has an effect on a policyholder’s
willingness to pay for the GMDB protection which is now very valuable to unemployed
policyholders with low account values. In contrast to previous studies, we find that this
effect causes very risk-averse policyholders in weak labor markets to be willing to pay the
GMDB fees to receive the protection.
In this study, we do not examine the interaction between weak job markets and poor
stock market performance. We would expect low accounts values and unemployment to be
correlated in the real economy and this would only serve to increase the range of overlap
between an insured’s willingness to pay and the fair price of the GMDB. This would be a
promising avenue for further research.
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